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A Unified Forum? The New Arbitration Rules for
Environmental Disputes Under the Permanent Court of
Arbitration
Charles Qiong Wu*

The international community has long been struggling to find an effective
mechanism to resolve transboundary environmental disputes. On June 19, 2001, the
ninety-four Member States of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA")' adopted
by consensus the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural
Resources and/or the Environment ("Rules"),2 based on the widely used Arbitration
Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL Rules").3 The drafters claim that the Rules make the PCA the first
unified international forum for environmental dispute resolution. Although the Rules
do provide several innovative features particularly suitable for handling environmental
disputes, the absence of compulsory jurisdiction and other procedural limitations will
seriously undermine the effectiveness and applicability of the Rules.
I. PROCEDURAL INNOVATIONS

The most significant procedural innovation of the Rules is that they permit
greater flexibility in the nature and number of parties that may engage in arbitration
than currently exists elsewhere. First, the Rules allow any combination of states, intergovernmental
organizations,
non-governmental
organizations
("NGOs"),
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1.

Established in 1899 at The Hague, the PCA is the oldest international institution for the settlement
of disputes among States. The PCA administers dispute settlement through conciliation, mediation,
facr-finding, and arbitration. Since the 1990s, the PCA has taken a series of steps to improve and
modernize the functioning of its system.
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural
Resources and/or the Environment ("Rules"), available online at
<htrp://wvrw.pca-cpa.org/EDR/ENRrules.htm> (visited Mar 24,2002).
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN 1976),
available online at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/BD/uncitralrules.htm> (visited Mar 24,2002).
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multinational corporations, and individuals to use them.4 Second, in a departure from
the traditional two-party adversarial system, the Rules also allow multi-party
arbitration.5
These innovations directly address the two principal lacunae in environmental
dispute resolution. First, it is widely acknowledged that granting NGOs direct access
to dispute resolution tribunals is indispensable to effective resolution of international
environmental controversies. 6 However, because the existing international legal system
is based on the notion of state sovereignty, only a state can be a party before various
tribunals; non-state actors gain access to these tribunals indirectly through state
actors. For example, most of the tribunals with universal jurisdiction, such as the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement Process, are open only to states. Even though some regional tribunals,
such as the Court of Justice of European Communities ("ECJ"), do provide access to
non-state actors, they must meet stringent standing requirements. The Rules make
the PCA the first universal tribunal through which NGOs and individuals can gain
equal footing with states and multinational corporations in environmental
controversies.
Second, it is equally necessary to have a multilateral system that can bring in all
of the interested parties to an environmental dispute. Because international
environmental problems often affect many entities and involve multiple sources and
cumulative causes, the existing two-party adversarial system of international litigation
is arguably incapable of dealing with such issues. Because the Rules are also open to
business entities and other interest groups, allowing environmental NGOs
involvement will not necessarily privilege environmental interest over other interests.
Therefore, the forum is unified in the sense that with such broad flexibility, there
should be no international environmental dispute that the PCA regime could not
accommodate procedurally.
Another notable innovation of the Rules is that parties may choose to use two
panels: one arbitrator panel and one expert panel. Like most arbitration rules, the
Rules allow parties to directly appoint a panel of arbitrators. In cases where the parties
cannot reach agreement, they may together choose an appointing authority and

4.
5.
6.

E-mail communication from the Assistant Counsel of the PCA to the author [on file with CJIL].
Under previous PCA arbitration rules, at least one of the parties has to be a state.
Rules at introduction (cited in note 2).
See Peggy Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for Access by Non-State
Entities, 12 Colo J Intl Envir L & Pol 191 (2001). The basic rationale is that NGOs usually are more
focused on environmental protection while States are typically preoccupied with diplomatic and
trade concerns. Moreover, NGOs are arguably more representative of public opinion, and more
capable of conceptualizing environmental problems and solutions across borders.
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entrust that authority with forming the arbitrator panel. Unlike other arbitral rules,
the PCA rules allow the arbitrator panel to appoint one or more experts to form an
expert panel that reports to the panel.' Further, to assist parties in rapidly appointing
arbitrators and gaining expert opinions, the PCA will provide a list of arbitrators with
legal experience in environmental protection or natural resource conservation, as well
as a list of environmental scientists who are qualified and willing to provide expert
assistance to the parties and the arbitral tribunal Although both lists are nominated
by Member States and the Secretary-General, parties are free to appoint arbitrators
from outside of the arbitrator list and the tribunal is free to select scientists from
outside of the scientist list. 10
PCA's emphasis on the arbitrators' environmental experience directly responds
to the criticism that judges on existing tribunals do not have the knowledge and
expertise to deal with complicated environmental issues. For example, even though the
ICJ established a special Chamber for Environmental Matters ("CEM") in 1993, no
state has ever brought a dispute to it-partly because the CEM judges do not have
any greater experience in environmental issues than their non-member colleagues. In
addition, the ICJ has itself been criticized for being insensitive to environmental
causes. For example, in the only environmental dispute brought before it in 1997, the
ICJ failed to accept the plaintiffs argument that the anticipated environmental
damage should excuse its performance under a treaty it entered with the defendant."
Notwithstanding the significance of this criticism, the creation of the expert
panel may be still more controversial. Because scientific information plays such a
critical role in environmental disputes, many international environmental treaties have
established scientific bodies to monitor changing environmental conditions and to
spearhead research developments. Very few of these treaties allow their respective
signatories to exert influence over the scientific body. Allowing parties to have some
input into the expert panel will increase disputants' confidence in the system. This
7.

Parties are free to choose an arbitral tribunal of one, three, or five persons. Rules at art 6-8 (cited in
note 2).

8.
9.
10.

Idatart 27.
Both lists are still under construction.
Note that these lists are different from the list of Members of the Court. Pursuant to the Hague
Conventions of both 1899 and 1907 under which the PCA was established, each Member State may
select a maximum of four arbitrators. The persons thus designated are referred to as "Members of
the Court." Under the Rules, arbitrators on this list are also available for parties to choose. See id,
introduction.
See Mari Nakamichi, The International Court of Justice Decision Regarding the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project, 9 Fordham Envir LJ 337 (1998). In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, the Hungarian People's
Republic entered into a treaty with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1977 for the construction
of a dam on the Danube River. The Hungarian government suspended and subsequently abandoned
the project, alleging grave risks to Hungarys environment and water supply. The ICJ held that the
potential environmental harm did not constitute a "state of necessity" under customary international
law and, hence, Hungary was still bound by the 1977 treaty.

11.
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benefit, however, comes at the price of sacrificing the independence and impartiality of
the expert panel. Because the arbitral tribunal must rely on the expert panel to assess
the magnitude of the risk, to identify the proximate cause, and to determine the level
of liability for the alleged environmental damage, one can expect that most of the
future battles will likely focus on the selection of expert panels.
The Rules also try to expedite the arbitration process through various innovative
measures. Time is of the essence in resolving environmental disputes because of the
possibility of irreversible damage to the ecosystem. Despite the need for an
expeditious process, existing tribunals have been slow in rendering decisions, in part
because such tribunals are not particularly well adapted for the type of fact-finding
necessary in complex environmental disputes. For example, it took eight years for the
ICJ to decide the Barcelona Traction Case 2 and six years to decide the South West
Africa Cases. 3 The amended Rules try to expedite the arbitral process by shortening
the period of time that the arbitration panel has to decide the case. 4 In addition, if the
parties cannot agree on arbitrators, the Secretary-General has the authority to directly
appoint arbitrators, rather than simply designating an appointing authority, as is the
case under the UNCITRAL Rules.15
Besides the procedural advantages provided by the Rules, parties also enjoy
certain institutional advantages associated with the PCA. For example, with all other
factors equal, the tribunal at the PCA is more affordable than some other choices
because the operating cost of the PCA's International Bureau is covered under the
budget of the United Nations. 6
II.

LIMITATIONS

The procedural resources provided by the Rules, together with the institutional
resources provided by the PCA, constitute a uniquely attractive forum for
international environmental dispute resolution. However, the forum shares a
common weakness with all other forums for international disputes: the lack of
compulsory jurisdiction. Before the resources mentioned above can be utilized, the
parties must agree to submit their disputes to this tribunal; one party alone cannot
force other parties to submit to the PCA's jurisdiction.
Therefore, the forum needs the support of some other enforceable instruments
to confer jurisdiction. One possible instrument is a multilateral treaty. States may
insert a clause into certain treaties requiring submission of disputes to arbitration at
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Case Concerningthe Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co, Ltd, 1970 ICJ 3.
Southwest Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), 1966 ICJ 4,48.
Rules at forward (cited in note 2).
Id at art 6.
Sean D. Murphy, Does the World Need a New International Court?, 32 Geo Wash J Intl L & Econ 333,

348 (2000).
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the PCA. As of 1995, some twenty-three multilateral environmental treaties provided
for unilateral submission of disputes to arbitration, and
twenty-one treaties allowed
17
submission to arbitration only upon parties' agreement.
Although many of these treaties provide detailed rules on the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal, only a few contain detailed procedures for arbitral proceedings."
Even for those that do specify procedures, the secretariats of the conventions are often
small and do not have enough financial or human resources to implement the
procedures. 9 Therefore, disputants under these treaties seldom pursue the recourse
of arbitration. The forum at the PCA could bridge this gap by serving as the
designated arbitral forum for future environmental agreements. Moreover, existing
international environmental arbitration decisions are scattered among different
tribunals, and often inconsistent. Shared use of the forum by various treaties would, in
turn, enhance its continuity and legitimacy, and the forum itself could become a
source of legal principles and precedents.
However, since most treaties are agreements among nations, non-state actors will
still have to rely on some form of state sponsorship to participate. Recent experience
indicates that states may invite NGOs into international environmental disputes.'
But even with such invitations, NGOs still do not have independent standing.
Nevertheless, private parties can obtain direct access to arbitral forums by private
contract. Thus, if a multinational corporation wants to invest in a developing country,
the host government could insert a provision into the investment contract requiring
submission of environmental disputes to arbitration at the PCA.21 But NGOs will
have very few occasions to enter into private contracts, and therefore have no
opportunity to insert such arbitration clauses.
On the other hand, if States and multinational corporations do not want to
expose themselves to suits brought by NGOs and individuals, the same opposition
remains when they are asked to enter into treaties or contracts that contain a
mandatory arbitration clause. States might never sign a treaty that may bring NGOs
into arbitration proceedings and a multinational corporation might never enter into a
contract that will be enforced by arbitration at the PCA. Even if they agree to use the
17.

18.
19.
20.

21.

Philippe Sands and Ruth MacKenzie, Guidelinesfor Negotiatingand DraftingDispute Settlement Clauses
for International Environmental Agreements, art 26, available online at <http://www.pcacpa.org/EDR/envannexl.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
Id at art 28.
Id.
In the recent Shrimp/Turtle case before the WTO, a number of developing countries challenged a
US regulation that prohibited shrimp imports from countries that failed to require turtle excluder
devices on shrimp harvesting nets. The US designated briefs from two groups of environmental
NGOs as an annex to its submission to the Panel. See Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the
Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the
European Court ofJustice and World Trade Organization,12 ColoJ Intl Envir L & Pol 47 (2001).
See Murphy, 32 Geo WashJ Intl L & Econ 333 (cited in note 16).
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PCA, they might still insist on excluding certain types of disputes from the
agreements to avoid unpredictable liabilities.
In criticizing the PCA forum for lacking compulsory jurisdiction, one should
realize that the problem is unlikely to be solved through procedural or institutional
innovations. There has been extensive discussion in the international legal community
about the need for an international environmental court that would have compulsory
jurisdiction over states and non-state actors. However, establishing such a court would
require states to surrender their sovereignty. Environmental disputes usually involve
vital national interests, making states even more unwilling to surrender their
autonomy. If states do not want to be held accountable to NGOs before existing
tribunals, they are unlikely to ratify an instrument creating such a court. In fact, the
question of an international environmental court was taken off the agenda at the 1992
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro because of opposition from participating states.
Therefore, because the international community operates on a consensus basis, an
environmental tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction is unlikely to emerge.
Mindful of the importance of cooperation in international arbitration, the
drafters of the Rules made every effort to give parties the maximum amount of
flexibility and autonomy. However, doing so may have limited the desirability of the
forum in some circumstances. For example, under the Rules each party bears its own
costs of arbitration.' This symmetric structure surely makes it easier for parties to
agree to arbitration, but developing countries, NGOs with little financial resources,
and indigent individuals might find it difficult to pay. Although the PCA provides a
Financial Assistance Fund to help developing countries meet the costs of arbitration,
only countries that are both members of the PCA and are listed as aid recipients by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development qualify. 23 Moreover,
since the Fund relies on voluntary contributions from states, organizations, and
individuals, the supply is not guaranteed and may not meet the demand of all qualified
countries. 24 Therefore, the cost allocation mechanism might thwart the PCA's goal of
becoming a truly unified forum.
In addition, the Rules may be inadequate to address certain new challenges
insofar as they simply transplant the UNCITRAL Rules from the commercial
context to the environmental context. For example, the Rules retain a provision
similar to the UNCITRAL Rules, granting the arbitral tribunal power to issue

22.
23.

Rules at art 40 (cited in note 2).
Permanent Court of Arbitration, FinancialAssistance Fundfor Settlement of InternationalDisputes, Terms

ofReference and Guidelines, art 5, available online at
24.

<hrtp://www.pca-cpa.org/BD/torfundenglish.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
Id at art 4; see also Bette E. Shifinan, The Revitalization of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23 Intl J
Legal Info 284, 287 (1995) (by 1995, only one government had made a significant commitment to
the find).
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interim orders and interim awards.2 It is foreseeable that this power will be invoked
much more frequently in the environmental context than in the commercial context
because environmental disputes usually involve irreparable harms. However, unlike
the final arbitral awards that are usually enforced by national courts pursuant to the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New
York Convention"),' interim orders and awards are not specifically covered in that
convention. The attitude of local courts varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For
example, in the US, once the parties agree to arbitrate, the court has no jurisdiction to
issue provisional remedies in aid of international arbitration and can only enforce the
final award.7 One could argue that, as a practical matter, parties would voluntarily
comply with such orders for fear of displeasing the arbitral tribunal. However,
previous cases show that parties have been reluctant to comply regardless of the
potential adverse consequences.s Moreover, in many environmental disputes, parties
may seek injunctions from local courts before the arbitral tribunal is set up. In those
cases, the court will be more reluctant to consider issuing an injunction because the
parties have agreed to arbitrate.
Finally, the measure of interim awards helps commercial disputants more than
environmental disputants. Both the UNCITRAL Rules and the PCA Rules
authorize the tribunal to collect security for costs of both interim awards and interim
orders. Thus, interim awards may be more easily enforced than interim orders. It is
usually difficult to measure environmental risks in monetary terms, and a damage
award is arguably inadequate to compensate for environmental losses. Therefore, the
enforcement problem of interim orders may deter some disputants from choosing this
forum.
III. CONCLUSION

For the past two decades, the world has seen extensive proliferation of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms. Just as arbitration is but one of various means to
settle disputes, the forum at the PCA is but one of various tribunals from which to
choose. In this marketplace of tribunals, each forum needs to find its own niche in
order to survive. Compared with other types of international dispute resolution,
arbitration guarantees that the dispute can be resolved by a peaceful means when all
other diplomatic methods fail. Within the category of arbitration, institutional

25.
26.

Rules at art 26 (cited in note 2).
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 UST 2517

(1970).
27.
28.

See David E. Wagoner, Interim Relief in InternationalArbitration:Enforcement Is a SubstantialProblem, 51
Disp ResolJ 68 (Oct 1996).
Vivienne M. Ashman, UNCITRAL Initiatives to Further Harmonize and Modernize Arbitration Laws,
Rules and Practices,624 PLI/Lit 635,654 (2000).
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tribunals enjoy advantages over ad hoc tribunals because they provide immediate
secretariat support and efficient administrative assistance. Such features may be
extremely attractive for environmental disputants. Compared with other arbitral
institutions, the PCA has the longest history, a broader membership representation,
and a closer tie with the UN. Although not an organ of the UN, the PCA was
granted permanent observer status in the General Assembly in 1993. In various
documents, the UN has encouraged the international community to use the PCA to
peacefully settle disputes.' The fact that its Secretary-General was entrusted by the
UNCITRAL Rules to designate appointing authorities further illustrates its
prominence in international arbitration.
Undoubtedly, this new set of arbitration rules will enhance the status of the
PCA as a permanent institution for environmental dispute arbitration. However,
despite numerous procedural innovations, the Rules will probably not be as effective
and unified as the drafters hoped. Since no case has been brought yet under the Rules,
a full evaluation is yet to be had of their actual performance and the impacts on the
international legal community. But if the Rules receive positive responses from the
international community, other tribunals may follow the PCA's lead and make
comparable changes to their own procedures for environmental dispute resolution.

29.

See Kofi A. Annan, Forward to the Basic Documents of the PermanentCourt ofArbitration, available online
at <http://www.pca-cpa.org/BD/foreword.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2002) ("1 encourage States,
international organizations and private parties to make greater use of the Court's services .").
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